Libertarian Free Will and punching babies

Proponents of libertarian free will typically point out unwanted consequences if determinism is true.  I want to even out the playing field a bit and point out the unwanted consequences too.

Suppose I hand you a baby and ask you not to punch the baby (or to punch the baby). Now that the baby-punching thought has entered your mind by virtue of my speaking it, you decide either to punch it or not.   The libertarian has to affirm that he could punch the baby based on his current reasons (or values), since on libertarian free will he could do otherwise.  That is to say, in your current sane state of mind, you could punch the baby no matter how strong your reasons are for not punching the baby.  This is not to say that under determinism there can’t be a future determined chain of events which lead to your punching the baby. It’s that the person that believes in determinism has the psychological assuredness that if he has his current reasons that he won’t punch the baby.

Libertarian free will proponents (on event-causal views) hold that reasons influence but do not deterministically cause choices.  I don’t see how libertarian indeterminism is any different than a form of probabilistic determinism.  If that’s right, the question is: For a requirement for moral responsibility, do you prefer probabilistic determinism or non-probabilistic determinism?  To put it another way, do you prefer a certain set of reasons determine choice A over B 100% of the time, or do you prefer a certain set of reasons probabilistically determine choice A over B 80% (or 90% etc.) of the time?

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