Monthly Archives: November 2014

Multiverses and the Inverse Gambler’s fallacy

Many have thought that the constants of this universe are fine-tuned for life. Some think this provides support for an intelligent designer; others think this provides support for a multiverse. While some multiverse models are inferred empirically (e.g. inflationary cosmology), … Continue reading

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Thoughts on Moral Twin Earth

In Normativity and Water: The Analogy and its Limits, Sharon Street claims that if synthetic ethical naturalists want to secure moral objectivity it will be by becoming Kantian constructivists or non-naturalists, thus giving up the naturalist view. Synthetic ethical naturalists … Continue reading

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Concluding Thoughts on MTE dialectic between Copp and Horgan & Timmons

This is the final post in my series of posts on the Moral Twin Earth. I’m largely unconvinced by Copp’s TSC strategy. During the dialectic, we have been talking of TC and TD as the referents, but once we get to Copp’s … Continue reading

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Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again

This is the third in a series of posts on the Moral Twin Earth.  In the last post Horgan and Timmons issued a challenge for Copp to find a determinate reference-fixing relation R. To meet Horgan and Timmons’ challenge, Copp … Continue reading

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Copping out of Moral Twin Earth

This is the second post in a series of posts about the Moral Twin Earth. In this paper Horgan and Timmons pose a dilemma for Copp and versions of moral naturalism where moral terms refer to some natural property. On … Continue reading

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